The Supreme Court of India is currently examining the constitutional validity of Muslim women’s unilateral right to dissolve marriage through Khula. Khula, literally translating to ‘remove,’ denotes a divorce initiated by the wife under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (Act), which governs marriage, divorce, and other family matters between Muslims. Although Muslim women can also obtain divorce under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, where a husband’s consent is not required, Khula is the more frequently chosen option despite the requirement of husbands’ consent. This is primarily due to overlapping cultural, financial, and religious factors. Khula remains predominantly extra-judicial in India, often negotiated in darul qazas (Islamic arbitration centres).

Socio-legal scholarship has demonstrated important aspects of religion and family law in India, such as Lemons’ analysis of the production of boundaries between religion and state through non-state institutions, Jones’ research on women qazis (religious judges) and their feminist interpretations of Islamic law, and Redding’s analysis of the Indian state’s reliance on non-state institutions. Comparatively less attention has been paid to women’s own perceptions and experiences of family law. This piece foregrounds women’s engagement with darul qazas to shed light on the production of legality in the social practice of seeking Khula. In doing so, it highlights the various challenges faced by women in securing their husbands’ consent.

Although darul qazas lack formal judicial authority, they are critical for understanding women’s experiences of Khula, as it is primarily mediated in such forums. Their procedures and decisions carry normative authority for Muslim women because they are perceived as socially legitimate for governing kinship relations. I draw upon women’s accounts from my research in North India, which focuses on individual and institutional perspectives on religious family laws, to uncover the contested terrain of how such laws are perceived, interpreted, and employed in divorce practices.

Existing scholarship explains that women prefer darul qazas for lower monetary costs and faster decisions. My interlocutors, however, also emphasized a new dimension: the religious legitimacy such bodies carry for them; a dimension that remains largely unexplored in the literature. Many described approaching a qazi as a necessary first step in Khula for them. Even where religious principles do not govern everyday lives, they can emerge as significant in establishing and dissolving marital ties.

As my interlocutors often explained, the marriage contract is founded on religious principles; so, its dissolution would be sought through religious authority. One of my interlocutors had secured her maintenance and custody through civil court; however, she still sought a religious dissolution from a qazi. These accounts demonstrate how women give effect to the law by treating darul qazas as meaningful forums, even as these forums recognise their lack of judicial status. It is within such engagements that the procedural constraints of Khula become visible.

An interlocutor’s case illustrates how the contingency of consent creates challenges in seeking divorce. Ayesha (pseudonym) had been married for six months, while her marriage remained unconsummated. After repeatedly asking her husband to seek medical consultation, Ayesha decided to seek Khula. Her family advised her not to mention her husband’s “inability” to consummate the marriage. She described the grounds for divorce as “temperamental differences” and “incompatibility.” Both spouses then consented to the Khula agreement in the qazi’s presence. Ayesha mentioned that she was grateful to follow her family’s advice. She contrasted her case with that of a friend whose husband was gay but married under familial pressures. Her friend explicitly stated their circumstances. She struggled for months to obtain her husband’s consent. As Ayesha explained, “No man will consent to such an agreement. It means he is agreeing to his shortcomings and providing evidence of it.” This demonstrates the central paradox in how Khula operates: women seeking Khula due to marital issues, including non-consummation or infliction of cruelty, are not simply seeking their husband’s consent. In effect, the procedure requires the husband to acknowledge those circumstances as ipso facto true, making consent less likely. It is not uncommon for mediations to take months when husbands do not agree on Khula.

This reveals that the requirement of consent is not merely a procedural formality but can create significant barriers for women. However, Islamic law is not monolithic, as interpretations often vary across different schools of jurisprudence. Courts in Pakistan have recognised women’s no-fault-based unilateral right to divorce through interpretations of Islamic law. Should India adopt a similar position on Khula, it would shift women’s position from seeking husbands’ consent to exercising an autonomous right to divorce. Furthermore, any legal reform should actively engage with darul qazas, as they remain primary forums for marriage dispute mediation.